Sur America

[il carcarlo]

Originalmente inviato da ilcamoscio

Ritornano i Bolivariani, con il petrolio sui 50$ e il rischio paese schizzato a livelli altissimi, ancora continua il "mitico" Chavez a fare solo e soltanto chiacchiere da 2 soldi. Intanto il Venezuela sprofonda.

Ma vi pagano ancora per inserire fesserie su questo thread ?

eh si!!! ma non solo.......
argentina in primis, ed ora ecuador e venezuela!!!
ed il real(brasile) sprofonda!!!pagando le conseguenze di tutti sti stron.zi

[doralino]

Il Cile brilla, è di un' altra categoria in confronto agli altri stati del continente


Time to Shine
November 25, 2008

By Luis Arcentales | New York

With the era of abundance of the past five years coming to an abrupt end, it is time for Chile to shine. Chile’s prudent set of macro policies has put the country on a solid footing to deal with the downturn and potential dislocations in financial markets. Much has been said of how most of Latin America, including Chile, is in better shape to weather the deep global slump, based on the surge in international reserves, superior public debt profiles and better fiscal results. But with the global economy entering a recession of uncertain depth and duration, Latam watchers ought to ask themselves not only which countries can avert a crisis, but also which ones have the most levers to pull in order to lean against the strong global headwinds. And on both of these counts – namely macro stability and the ability to engage in counter-cyclical policies – Chile seems to be in a league of its own.

The rising cyclical tide of the past five years supercharged many Latin American economies, but Chile did not seem to be one of them. Now that the global tide is receding at an alarming pace, pressure points are surfacing throughout the region (see “Latin America: The Case for Caution”, EM Economist, October 24, 2008). Chile has not been immune to the pain from the global financial turmoil; however, the response by both the central bank and finance ministry has been effective in easing local funding pressures and extending targeted aid to sectors likely to suffer disproportionately from the credit crunch.

Whether we focus on its ammunition – record reserves and fiscal assets of near 15pp of GDP – or its ability to deliver effectively, Chile seems to be in an enviable position to engineer a normal cyclical downturn even if the globe turns out to be less hospitable than we currently expect (see Beyond a Deeper Recession: Tepid Recovery, Richard Berner and David Greenlaw, November 10, 2008).

Fiscal Firepower

Far from just a by-product of the recent years of abundance, Chile’s fiscal strength has come from a prudent strategy focused on saving for a rainy day (see “Latin America: Shocking the Fiscal Abundance Story”, EM Economist, October 3, 2008). And that rainy day has arrived: armed with massive savings, Chile has ample room to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy even if tax receipts disappoint, whether driven by slower growth, lower copper quotes or both. Indeed, whereas higher growth and commodity prices have translated into higher expenditures throughout the region, in Chile’s case it has also generated massive savings and a sharp reduction in public indebtedness. Importantly, faced with growing expenditures, Chile has been able to execute: by 3Q08, 74.1% of the budget had been executed compared to 69.1% in the same period last year, while for public investment that figure was 70.3% versus 59.1% in 2007.

Unlike any country in the region, Chile is sitting on a substantial war chest that allows it plenty of room to engage in fiscal stimulus, as Chile’s structural balance rule has allowed fiscal authorities to transform the country’s copper wealth into financial assets (see “Chile: Can’t Beat the Real Thing!” EM Economist, March 28, 2008). At the end of September, the main Economic & Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) had US$19.3 billion in assets while the smaller Pensions’ Reserve Fund (FRP) had US$2.4 billion. In addition, the Treasury was sitting on US$6.3 billion, which are simply funds derived from a mismatch between the point when revenues are received and the time when the actual outlays take place.

With the peso selling off substantially in the past few months, it is worth highlighting that 92% of the government’s assets are in non-peso assets, leading to major translation gains if the authorities needed to liquidate some assets. And while the plan to diversify the FEES assets into equities (15% of total) and corporate debt (20%) remains on track – which we see as a sound financial strategy – today’s allocation of 70.8% of assets in sovereign debt and the remaining 29.2% of assets in bank deposits has meant that financial turbulence has had a limited impact on the value of Chile’s funds. On the debt front, since end-2002 the stock of (gross) government debt has fallen from 15.7% to a trivial 4.4% of GDP by September 2008.

Not only does Chile have plenty of fiscal ammunition, but it has also been able to deliver it effectively, in our view. And Chileans appear to share this favorable opinion. Despite the sharp drop in equities, the peso and copper during October, the approval of the government’s handling of the economy soared to 44% from 32% in September, according to Adimark’s monthly survey.

The government’s timely fiscal measures announced in early November worth US$1.2 billion target sectors that seem most vulnerable to the financial turmoil, indicating that the authorities have a good understanding of how to address the growing pressure points. The credit crunch has hit the more risky credit segments particularly hard, as is the case of SMEs. The government is addressing this issue by earmarking US$200 million for SMEs programs via development corporation Corfo; in addition, it is injecting US$130 million into a fund (Fogape) that guarantees loans to the SMEs. State-owned BancoEstado will receive US$500 million in fresh capital to boost its ability to lend and enhance its competitive position relative to private banks. Lastly, the package includes subsidies for the acquisition of new houses. Data from Chile’s construction chamber show that sales of new houses and apartments dropped 23% in 3Q, while the stock of houses for sale rose to 23 months, up from 17 months a year earlier.

All these actions follow a US$850 million package unveiled on October 13 to boost guarantees for exporters’ credit lines (US$50 million), guarantees for long-term funding for SMEs investment (US$500 million), a line of credit for small businesses’ working capital (US$200 million) and US$100 million for credit lines for non-banking factoring. Taken together, the message contained in these fiscal measures is one of a government that has resources to help the economy and is putting these funds to work in a smart way.

With local USD liquidity drying up, the Treasury took advantage of its strong liquidity position by opportunistically depositing US$1.1 billion in local banks in early October. Since then, with help from the central bank, the Treasury has successfully auctioned a further US$700 million in 91-day deposits.

Monetary Wisdom

No central bank in the region has probably come under so much heat as Chile’s for its decision to intervene in currency markets and for its handling of the surge in inflation, which as of October was running at an annual rate of 9.9% – the highest in 14 years. In fact, we were critical of the move starting April 14 to start accumulating US$8 billion due to the need to “strengthen Chile’s international liquidity position”, which at the time we found inconsistent with the urgent task of addressing mounting price pressures and keeping inflation expectations in check (see “Chile: A Risky Bet”, EM Economist, April 11, 2008). Indeed, even as it intervened in currency markets, the central bank was forced to aggressively hike its target rate by 200bp to 8.25% between June and September, as the inflation outlook worsened.

No Skeletons in This Closet

With all the challenges posed by the global financial crisis, the importance of a solid regulatory framework can often be ignored. However, given the speed and magnitude at which the financial pain of the industrialized world has spread into emerging markets, pressure points that could have been prevented by better regulation are quickly appearing. In Chile’s case, so far, no skeletons have appeared.

While the Chilean peso has sold off by a similar magnitude as other regional currencies, there have not been any high-profile corporate casualties in Chile. My colleague Marcelo Carvalho argues that years of steady currency appreciation lulled companies in Brazil into a false sense of security, encouraging them to bet on further currency strengthening (see “Brazil: Corporate Debt Pressure Points”, EM Economist, October 31, 2008). In similar fashion, several Mexican corporates entered in derivatives contracts, betting on persistent low volatility of the peso. Despite similar relative currency moves, Chile has not seen any major corporation fall victim to currency bets. We suspect that this speaks of both superior corporate governance and regulations, which include reporting to the central bank any type of derivative exposure. Beyond the hits to specific companies, such derivative losses have made it more difficult for the business sector to access credit; in contrast, credit in Chile has not shut down, as shown by the successful local placement of over US$200 million in debt by a major pulp producer in early November.

Within Latin America and even on a global basis, Chile earns high marks for the transparency, predictability and soundness of its regulations − many of which, such as the General Banking Act of 1986, emerged from the painful banking crisis of the 1980s (see Macro and Micro Radars, 2nd Half 2008, November 24, 2008). Indeed, Chilean banks are considered the 18th most sound out of 134 countries surveyed by the World Economic Forum. In terms of securities’ market regulation, Chile earns the 14th spot worldwide. As investors look for regulatory vulnerabilities that could lead to the next accident in the emerging market space, they are likely to be disappointed by Chile.

Bottom Line

With the era of abundance of the past five years coming to an abrupt end, it is time for Chile to shine. Chile’s prudent set of macro policies has put the country on a solid footing to deal with the ongoing cyclical downturn and potential dislocations in financial markets. With the global economy entering a recession of uncertain depth and duration, Latam watchers ought to ask themselves not only which countries can avert a crisis, but also which ones have the most levers to pull in order to lean against the strong global headwinds. And on both of these fronts, namely macro stability and the ability to engage in counter-cyclical policies, Chile seems to be in a league of its own.


http://www.morganstanley.com/views/g...81125-Tue.html

[ilcamoscio]

Bolivariani, ecco cosa fanno i vostri governanti.
Viva il socialismo del dittatorello Chavez.


El siguiente es un artículo del economista José Guerra para Analítica.

Después de dejar de lado las recomendaciones de Armando León y Rodrigo Cabezas, quienes aconsejaban que el gobierno no interviniera en ese mercado porque el mismo era marginal, el Ejecutivo optó, a comienzo de este año, por actuar con firmeza para bajar el precio del dólar en el mercado paralelo. Lo hizo empleando el remanente de notas estructuradas que mantenía el Ministerio de Finanzas para entonces. Ello permitió bajar la cotización desde Bs/US$ 6.500 en diciembre de 2007 hasta Bs/US$ 3.300 a mediados de marzo de 2008.

Una vez que se agotaron las notas estructuradas, el dólar comenzó de nuevo su escalada sostenida hasta alcanzar valores de finales del año 2007. Sin embargo, últimamente la tendencia ha sido a la disminución, no obstante la declinación de los precios del petróleo y el hecho de que Cadivi está restringiendo la entrega de divisas preferenciales.

¿A qué obedece esa caída del precio del dolar paralelo?

Un factor explica ese hecho. PDVSA y Fonden están vendiendo divisas de forma sistemática en ese mercado, violando lo establecido en el Convenio Cambiario, que establece que todas las divisas deben transarse al tipo de cambio oficial. Se sabe de los apremios de caja de PDVSA y sus deudas acumuladas, por ello ha recurrido a ese mercado para rentabilizar sus dólares. Para ello se sirve de dos casas de bolsa con las cuales realiza esta práctica cuestionable, con el consiguiente reparto de las comisiones a que da lugar ese negocio. Lo mismo hace Fonden para obtener recursos en moneda nacional y con ello financiar sus gastos. Es decir, el gobierno devalúa el bolívar en los hechos y propicia la especulación cambiaria. Esta práctica corrupta y corruptora se hace frente a un Directorio del Banco Central disminuido, inerme, desmoralizado y sin autoridad para poner orden en el mercado cambiario. Espero que el BCV no sea cómplice de estas operaciones.

[El Chacal]

Si sapeva (per pochi) sin dagli anni 70 !

Venezuela certifica oficialmente las mayores reservas de petróleo del mundo

[El Chacal]

Venezuela asegura registrar las mayores reservas de petróleo del mundo (+Infografía) en Noticias24.com












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[martin707]

[QUOTE=El Chacal;28148867]Venezuela asegura registrar las mayores reservas de petróleo del mundo (+Infografía) en Noticias24.com

Chacal, de que sirven las reservas si PDVSA se esta quedando sin equipos? Es lamentable el mal aprovechamiento del recurso.

Sciacallo, che servono le riserve se PDVSA sta finendo di squadre?

Venezuela rende ancora emissione di obbligazioni ...