Deutsche bank de0003083358

[steffy]

Salve a tutti e complimenti a questo forum. Volevo chiedere se qualcuno conosceva l'obbligazione della Deutsche Bank DE0003083358 con scadenza 04/06/2019 e soprattutto se potrebbe essere abbastanza sicura, io la vedrei in un'ottica da cassettista. Grazie a chiunque di voi mi potrà rispondere.

[tantoquanto]

Titolo illiquido di banca tedesca messa non propriamente bene.
Oggi dopo molto tempo c'è un po' di lettera a 82,27 per cui se devi acquistare fallo subito...
Paga 82% tasso irs a 10 anni con minimo 4% (rendimento minimo a scadenza circa 5,65%).
Da acquistare in ottica da cassettista e per modesta percentuale del portafoglio.

[cricket72]

AVVISO

Le informazioni contenute nel forum e negli eventuali link di seguito, hanno il solo e unico scopo di fornire elementi di studio, analisi o simulazioni ed analisi sull'andamento di titoli quotati sui mercati finanziari. I mercati obbligazionari sono aree di investimento speculative e solo ognuno di VOI - capace di intendere, di volere e di agire, può essere in grado di valutare quale livello di rischio é personalmente più appropriato.
Anche le obbligazioni/Titoli di Stato sono strumenti speculativi potendo esporre lo speculatore/investitore a perdere tutto ciò che si è investito. Ogni lettore deve considerarsi responsabile per i rischi dei propri investimenti e per l'uso che fa delle informazioni contenute di seguito.
Il materiale riportato di seguito in ogni sua forma ed espressione non costituisce servizio di consulenza, né in alcun modo sollecitazione di pubblico risparmio nè sollecitazione all'acquisto o alla vendita di valori mobiliari e al pubblico risparmio.

[cricket72]

Originalmente inviato da tantoquanto

Paga 82% tasso irs a 10 anni con minimo 4% (rendimento minimo a scadenza circa 5,65%).

dovrebbe essere 82% del tasso swap a 30 anni
""Tasso di interesse sottostante
Euro Interest Rate Swap a 30 anni (Tasso swap a 30 anni).""

http://www.eurotlx.com/tlx/pdf/DE0003083358_IT.pdf

[cricket72]

per quanto riguarda la banca puoi visionare qualche ultimo report di fitch o S&P

Deutsche Bank AG

fitch 22 gennaio 2009


Rating Rationale
· The ratings of Deutsche Bank AG (DB) are based on its strong global franchise,
stable capitalisation and overall good risk management, which have helped the
bank weather the financial market crisis better than many peers. The Rating
Watch Negative (RWN) reflects Fitch Ratings’ concerns about DB’s vulnerability
to market volatility and asset devaluation stemming from its large corporate
and investment banking business and the respective impact on its earnings
capacity and profitability given ongoing market turbulence.
· DB expects a net loss of about EUR4.8bn for Q408 and EUR3.9bn for FY08,
driven by losses from its sales and trading businesses, costs of exposure
reduction, additional provisions against monoline insurers and reorganisation
charges. Although DB responded rapidly to deteriorating market conditions,
substantially reducing its risk positions to CDOs and sub‐prime RMBS at an early
stage, it had to digest substantial write‐downs on its commercial real estate and
leveraged finance and monoline counterparty exposures. However, the
potential for further market valuation losses has been reduced by cancellation
of commitments, sales of some positions and transfers to the banking book. DB
has made only limited use of the fair‐value option on its own debt, which could
have provided additional pre‐tax gains of EUR5.5bn in FY08.
· For 9M08 the corporate banking and securities sub‐division, the former key
driver of group profit, reported a EUR789m pre‐tax loss. To reduce earnings
volatility the bank has been expanding its “stable” businesses (private
clients/asset management and transaction banking), including its acquisition of
a 22.9% shareholding in Deutsche Postbank in Q109, which is expected to result
in a majority stake after three years. Terms and conditions of the transaction
with a cash value of EUR4.9bn were amended in January 2009, reducing capital
consumption to EUR1bn from EUR2.2bn.
· DB intends to reduce its comparatively high leverage ratio to 30 under US GAAP
(34 at end‐9M08), largely by reducing trading assets and repo business. Its Tier 1
ratio is expected to be about 10% at end‐FY08, meeting its published target.
Measures to maintain this level included the reduction of certain assets, the
conversion of hybrid capital instruments into Tier 1 capital and a reduced
dividend payment for FY08. DB does not seek any government support in terms
of guarantees or capital. DB’s eligible capital ratio remained strong.
Support
· DB is of such importance internationally and domestically that, in Fitch’s
opinion, there would be an extremely high probability of support from the
German government, if needed.
What Could Trigger a Downgrade?
· Fitch will monitor DB’s steps to further reduce its risk profile and leverage and
assess the level of profitability and capitalisation in relation to its risk appetite
in the difficult market environment.
Profile
DB is a leading global investment bank and one of Europe’s largest commercial
banks. DB focuses on the mass affluent retail market and serves 14 million
customers. Its retail asset management, branded DWS, is market leader in Germany.

http://www.db.com/ir/en/download/Fit...2_Jan_2009.pdf


Research Update:
Deutsche Bank 'A+/A-1' Ratings Affirmed
Following 2008 Loss; Outlook Remains Stable

Standard & Poor's 15 gennaio 2009


Rationale
On Jan. 15, 2009, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'A+/A-1'
counterparty credit ratings on Deutsche Bank AG. The outlook remains stable.
This follows yesterday's announcement that Deutsche Bank suffered a net
loss of €4.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008. According to the bank,
this was mainly attributable to the combination of a substantial deleveraging
and reduction in the trading books during a period of extreme volatility,
correlation, and basis risk in the capital markets. This had a severe effect
on revenues in the global markets activity, particularly in credit trading,
equity derivatives, and equity proprietary trading. Outside the global markets
business, there were further markdowns on exposures to monoline insurers,
injections into money market funds, and a write-down on intangible assets. The
net loss also comes despite significant write-backs on cancelled leveraged
loan transactions.
The very difficult environment in the fourth quarter was widely known,
and some competitors had already reported losses. These exceptionally poor
trading conditions were considered an important factor in the recent downgrade
of Deutsche Bank on Dec. 19, 2008, along with a number of other major
financial institutions. (For more information, see "Deutsche Bank AG Ratings
Lowered To 'A+/A-1' On Industry Review; Outlook Stable," published on Dec. 19,
2008, on RatingsDirect.)
Nevertheless, the reported loss was greater than we expected at the time
of our downgrade. Although Deutsche Bank has succeeded in meeting its targeted
10% Tier 1 ratio at year end, we believe that the fourth-quarter loss has
reduced the quality of capital. According to Standard & Poor's measures,
capitalization is likely to have declined from a level we consider adequate.
Set against this, however, we understand that Deutsche Bank continued to
reduce the risk inherent in its trading activities during the quarter, and
exposures to certain risky assets such as leveraged loans have been cut
materially. In addition, the restructured acquisition of a stake in Deutsche
Postbank AG (A-/Positive/A-2) reduces the future regulatory capital
requirement of the transaction by about €1.2 billion.
Outlook
The outlook remains stable. We believe that the massive deleveraging in late
2008 is unlikely to be repeated and do not expect further losses on this
scale. However, the weaker capital position does, in our opinion, leave
Deutsche Bank more vulnerable to further potential adverse shocks, for
example, more trading losses and a potentially very sharp increase in
impairments as economies contract. We consider that a further decline in
Standard & Poor’s RatingsDirect | January 15, 2009 2
Standard & Poor's. All rights reserved. No reprint or dissemination without S&P's permission. See Terms of Use/Disclaimer on the last page. 696438 | 300319967
capitalization would likely lead to a dilution in Deutsche Bank's stand-alone
credit profile, and that this could have repercussions for the
confidence-sensitive capital markets business in particular.
Nevertheless, given Deutsche Bank's high systemic importance, we believe
government support would be forthcoming, limiting the impact on the
counterparty credit rating. For this reason, the outlook remains
stable--although a downgrade could occur if we perceive that external support
may not be forthcoming. A downgrade could also occur, in particular, if
material additional charges from trading, credit, or litigation risks affected
capital, or if a material and persistent slowdown in operating revenues were
to jeopardize Deutsche Bank's medium-term earnings potential. An upgrade is
considered highly unlikely in the current environment.

http://www.db.com/ir/en/download/S_P...5_Jan_2009.pdf

[cricket72]

c'è anche un report di moody's del 9 febbraio 2009

Issuer Comment: Deutsche Bank AG
Earnings Commentary - Fourth Quarter 2008

Deutsche Bank AG (DB) reported an after-tax loss of -!4.8 billion (-6.2 billion pre-tax), in line with its preannouncement on January 14. For the full year, DB reported an after-tax loss of -3.9 billion (-5.7 billion pre-tax).
As we noted in our January 14 press release, the bank's substantial losses during the quarter highlight a significant risk appetite and over-reliance on hedging and diversification strategies which have proven ineffective
in the current market environment. On December 5, 2008, Moody's changed the outlook on Deutsche Bank's ratings to negative from stable, reflecting the challenges DB faces in light of its sizable exposure to capital markets. The bank has a bank financial strength rating of B and its deposits and senior debt are rated Aa1.
The rating outlook is negative.
DB reported lower earnings on a linked-quarter, quarter-over-quarter, and year-over-year basis in all of its business segments except Global Transaction Banking. Even the more stable businesses of Asset and Wealth Management and Private & Business Clients saw a sharp drop in earnings. This raises some concerns about the
franchise value of these businesses. Asset and Wealth Management reported a loss due to goodwill impairments, writedowns on seed capital and infrastructure investments, and further injections into money market funds, but even excluding those charges the business would have only broken even, reflecting a drop in performance fee
income as well as net money outflows. Private & Business Clients saw higher loan loss provisioning, reflecting a rise in problem loans due to the global economic slowdown, as well as a drop in fee income and lower net interest margins, despite deposit and loan growth.
The principal contributor to DB's losses was the Corporate Banking & Securities business. The bank suffered net trading losses in both Debt (-3.4 billion) and Equity (-2.1 billion) Sales and Trading. These losses reflected substantial basis and correlation risk which the bank admits its models and stress testing did not adequately
capture. While the bank has significantly reduced the size of its non-derivatives trading portfolios and has also reportedly laid off much of its basis risk, the risk management errors revealed by these losses have increased the negative pressure on the bank's ratings. These losses highlight the concerns we expressed in the October 2008
special comment "Impact of the Credit Crisis on Moody's Rating Methodology and the Credit Profiles of Investment Banks." As we noted in that report, "the recent massive losses at some wholesale investment banks, combined with increased complexity and opacity of their positions, argue for skepticism about the robustness of
risk management within the industry." The fourth quarter clearly revealed that Deutsche Bank is not immune from these challenges.
During the quarter DB also took 1.8 billion in additional charges on structured exposures, of which 1.1 billion were related to the bank's monoline exposures. These charges were partially offset by 930 million in gains on
marks previously taken on two unfunded leveraged loan commitments which were cancelled. DB has avoided the magnitude of writedowns on structured exposures taken by many of its peers. However, this is in part due to the
bank's decision to reclassify a sizable portfolio of structured assets during the third and fourth quarter using the IAS39 look-back option. After reclassifying 24.9 billion in the third quarter, thus avoiding 845 million in marks,
the bank reclassified a further 11.0 billion in the fourth quarter, allowing it to avoid an additional 1.2 billion in marks.
Deutsche Bank took a number of steps to offset the negative impact the quarter's losses would otherwise have had on its capital position. These included a reduction in the annual dividend, leading to a 1.0 billion release of
previously accrued dividends. The bank also raised 0.9 billion in Tier 1 capital from the conversion of certain contingent capital instruments. Other additions to Tier 1 totalling 1.2 billion came from a restructuring of restricted equity units and OCI gains from the adoption of a new pension accounting standard, among others. And
finally, continued de-leveraging allowed the bank to reduce it's risk-weighted assets during the quarter. As a result, the bank reported a Tier 1 capital ratio (under Basel 2) of 10.1% at year-end, just slightly below the 10.3% it reported as of September 30, 2008 and up from 9.2% at March 31, 2008. We consider the actions taken by the
bank to strengthen its capital position as an important offset to the losses the bank suffered in the quarter.
Notwithstanding this, we also believe that the bank's reliance on hybrid capital instruments may have increased during the quarter. The bank disclosed that its Tier 1 capital decreased by 1.7 billion during the quarter, while shareholders equity declined by 5.3 billion.
In response to the losses, Deutsche Bank's management has adopted a more conservative risk appetite, as well as an increased focus on avoiding large notional exposures. Going forward, Moody's will focus on the future
earnings and risk profile of Deutsche Bank under its revised strategy, and more importantly the permanence of that strategy. Deutsche Bank's risk reduction program could lead to a less volatile earnings profile. However, even
if successful over the near-term, the bank is likely to face pressures to return to a more aggressive strategy in the future, when market conditions improve.
As a part of its revised strategy, Deutsche Bank has expressed a greater interest in retail banking. While the bank remains committed to acquiring a stake in Deutsche Postbank AG ("Postbank", rated Aa2/C+ stable), Moody's
believes that the acquisition of a controlling interest may be delayed due to challenges at Postbank. While acquiring Postbank's structured assets portfolio is clearly not desirable, the possibility of delay raises greater
uncertainty for Moody's regarding the extent to which Deutsche Bank will continue to rely upon more volatile sources of earnings in the future. Moody's views the eventual acquisition of a controlling interest in Postbank to
be an important underpinning of Deutsche Bank's current ratings. To the extent the acquisition or related benefits are delayed, or the acquisition causes a substantial decline in Deutsche Bank's capital position, it could have negative implications for Deutsche Bank's ratings.

http://www.db.com/ir/en/download/Moo...9_Feb_2009.pdf

[cricket72]

inoltre bisognerebbe seguire anche come evolve la situazione in germania


Germania: lo Stato nazionalizza le banche

18/02 19:41 CET


Nazionalizzare le banche per scongiurarne il fallimento. Il governo tedesco ha approvato un progetto di legge che prevede la possibilità per lo Stato di espropriare le azioni degli istituti di credito in difficoltà finanziaria. É un provvedimento generale ma sembra fatto su misura per la Hypo Real Estate, banca tedesca sull’orlo della bancarotta. Il ministro delle Finanze Peer Steinbrück esclude una deriva statalista.

“Il nostro obiettivo non è estendere l’influenza pubblica, ma salvaguardare il capitale pubblico. Vogliamo utilizzare bene i soldi dei contribuenti, già inseriti nel sistema per supportare le banche”.

Alla Hypo Real Estate lo Stato tedesco ha già versato 102 milioni di euro di fondi pubblici.

Il progetto di legge dovrà ora essere approvato dal Parlamento. Concede al governo i poteri di intervenire con lo strumento dell’esproprio fino al 30 giugno. Ma lo Stato ricorrerebbe a questa misura estrema solo nel caso di banche rilevanti per il sistema, proprio come la Hypo.

[tantoquanto]

Originalmente inviato da cricket72

dovrebbe essere 82% del tasso swap a 30 anni

Vero

Originalmente inviato da cricket72

inoltre bisognerebbe seguire anche come evolve la situazione in germania

E, se si acquista in ottica da cassettista, bisognerebbe anche prevedere se nel 2019 si è ancora vivi

[Iron Fizzetti]

GRAZIE PER LE INFO

entrato adesso a 82,01 con personale taglio minimo

[eXeGi]

Originalmente inviato da steffy

Salve a tutti e complimenti a questo forum. Volevo chiedere se qualcuno conosceva l'obbligazione della Deutsche Bank DE0003083358 con scadenza 04/06/2019 e soprattutto se potrebbe essere abbastanza sicura, io la vedrei in un'ottica da cassettista. Grazie a chiunque di voi mi potrà rispondere.

Riprendo questa vecchia traccia per chiedervi un parere in quanto mi hanno consigliato in banca questo titolo ed io ho preso tempo dicendo "chiederò ad un amico prima di decidere.."
Deutsche Bank DE0003083358 con scadenza 04/06/2019
sulla carta non dovrebbe avere niente di sospetto - rating A+ ,durata lunga ma non lunghissima ,cedola discreta (4.219 poi min 4) eppure sta ad 83!
per non fare la parte dello sprovveduto :cosa non va?