Nazionalizzazione banche del Kazakhstan

[lucailmoro]

Kazakhstan's BTA Bank to be nationalised

February 2, 2009

The Kazakh government will today buy a controlling stake in Kazakhstan’s
largest bank, BTA Bank, the bank announced at a press conference in Almaty
this morning.

It will pay $1.75bn for a 78.14% stake in BTA, Yelena Bakhmutova, head of
financial regulator the AFN, said at a government session this morning.

Another of Kazakhstan’s top four banks - Alliance Bank - is to hold a
press conference at 12 noon Almaty time (6am GMT). It is expected to also
announce that the government will take a controlling stake.

BTA’s chairman Mukhtar Ablyazov has been dismissed from his post, it was
announced at a press conference in Almaty. Arman Dunayev, chairman of the
board of directors of Samruk-Kazyna, will join BTA’s board of directors.
Anvar Saidenov, until recently chairman of the National Bank of
Kazakhstan, is to join BTA as an adviser to the board.

The government had originally planned to take a 25% stake in BTA as part
of its programme to inject capital into the country’s four largest banks.
However, the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange suspended trading in BTA’s ordinary
shares Friday, January 30, after the share price fell 40%. The bank’s
management has been in emergency talks with the Kazakh government, the
national bank and Samruk-Kazyna over the weekend.

The government is also expected to step in to save Alliance Bank. Trading
in Alliance’s shares was suspended on January 29 after its share price
plummeted.

Prime Minister Karim Massimov told a government session this morning that
it may pay only a token 100 tenge - under $1 - to buy more than 76% of the
bank from current owner Seimar Alliance Financial Corporation.

The Kazakh government may seek to sell its stake in BTA once the financial
crisis is over. Dunayev told journalists that the government is in
discussions with Sberbank about the possible sale of its stake in BTA to
the Russian state-owned bank.

[lucailmoro]

Che ne pensate ? cosa deriverà da queste nazionalizzazioni? Riconversione del debito????

[cricket72]

Kazakhstan-Based Kazkommertsbank (JSC) And Halyk Bank Downgraded On Lower Likelihood Of State Support; Outlooks Negative


Primary Credit Analyst:
Ekaterina Trofimova, Paris
Secondary Credit Analysts:
Magar Kouyoumdjian, London

Publication date: 06-May-09, 14:03:18 EST


PARIS (Standard & Poor's) May 6, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
today said it downgraded two leading Kazakhstan-based banks, Kazkommertsbank
(JSC) (KKB) and Halyk Savings Bank of Kazakhstan (Halyk).
We lowered the long-term counterparty credit ratings on KKB to 'B+' from
'BB-' and on Halyk to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The outlooks on both banks are
negative. At the same time, we affirmed the 'B' short-term counterparty credit
ratings on both banks.
"The rating actions reflect our uncertainty regarding future support for
KKB and Halyk from the Kazakh government," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Ekaterina Trofimova.
In light of this, we have revised our classification of the Republic of
Kazakhstan (foreign currency BBB-/Negative/A-3, local currency
BBB/Negative/A-3) to "supportive" from "interventionist" with regard to the
government's propensity to intervene and support systemically important banks.
We continue to view KKB and Halyk as highly important to the Kazakh
economy and financial sector, and both remain government-related entities
(GREs) under Standard & Poor's criteria. In accordance with our methodology
for rating GREs, our assessment of the potential for a government to provide
extraordinary support to systemically important private sector banks is based
on a country's willingness, track record, and financial ability to provide
support, subject to legal and regulatory barriers.
The recent failures of BTA Bank J.S.C. (D/--/D) and Alliance Bank JSC
(SD/--/SD), both of which we previously classified as systemically important
banks in Kazakhstan, raise questions about the government's willingness and
ability to rescue financial institutions and enable them to honor all their
foreign and local currency debts. Bank BTA failed despite its being majority
owned by the government, for example. Moral hazard concerns and the strategic
priority given to protecting the country's fiscal reserves have constrained
Kazakhstan's commitment to support its banks, in our opinion.
We note the Kazakh government has provided funding and capital support to
its major banks--over $7 billion since the second half of 2008. But these
actions were not sufficient to prevent the Bank BTA and Alliance failures. We
no longer include a one-notch uplift, over the stand-alone credit profiles, in
the long-term counterparty credit ratings on KKB and Halyk, to reflect future
government support for these two banking groups.
KKB and Halyk remain systemically important GREs under our methodology.
The government recently took a 21% stake in Halyk and is in the process of
obtaining a minority stake--not to exceed 25%--in KKB.
We believe the Kazakh government will likely continue taking supportive
actions for KKB and Halyk, including the provision of additional funding and
making further capital investments. The ratings on KKB and Halyk factor in
material government support measures implemented to date.
The negative outlooks on KKB and Halyk reflect the difficulties both
banks will likely encounter, we believe, in refinancing existing funding with
respect to future business growth. We expect asset quality will deteriorate
further at the two banks, negatively affecting their capitalizations and
financial performances.
If this deterioration is greater than we expect or if Kazakh economic
problems deepen to the extent that we perceive they materially affect Kazakh
bank fundamentals, we would lower the ratings on KKB, Halyk, or both.
The potential for an upgrade of either bank is currently slim, at least
until domestic market pressures ease--a development we consider unlikely in
the near term. Significant reductions in wholesale funding and loan
concentrations, lower foreign currency lending, stronger capitalization,
improved asset quality, and sustainable good financial performance would lead
to us to raise the ratings on one or both of the banks, depending on how each
bank negotiates the difficult operating environment in Kazakhstan.

[cricket72]

Republic of Kazakhstan Outlook Revised To Stable On Easing Bank Contingent Liability Concerns; Ratings Affirmed



Primary Credit Analyst:
Ben Faulks, London
Secondary Credit Analyst:
Frank Gill, London

Publication date: 08-May-09, 11:53:03 EST


-- We expect the Kazakh government to limit potential liabilities arising
from banking pressures, while at the same time providing sufficient resources
to underpin depositor confidence and to allow the system to function in a
manner supportive of the economy, despite near-term challenges.
-- We are revising the outlook on the Republic of Kazakhstan to stable
from negative, while affirming the sovereign credit ratings.


LONDON (Standard & Poor's) May 8, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
today said it had revised its outlook on the Republic of Kazakhstan to stable
from negative. At the same time, the 'BBB-' foreign currency and 'BBB' local
currency long-term sovereign credit ratings were affirmed. The 'A-3' foreign
and local currency short-term ratings and the 'kzAAA' national scale ratings
were also affirmed. The Transfer & Convertibility assessment on Kazakhstan is
'BBB'.
"The outlook revision reflects the Kazakh government's emerging policy in
limiting potential liabilities arising from banking pressures, while at the
same time providing sufficient resources to underpin depositor confidence and
to allow the system to function in a manner supportive of the economy, despite
near-term challenges," Standard & Poor's credit analyst Ben Faulks said.
The government's decision to restructure rather than guarantee or repay
the debt of BTA Bank J.S.C. (D/--/D), Kazakhstan's largest bank (which it took
over in February), and its refusal to take over the fourth-largest bank,
Alliance Bank JSC (SD/--/SD) (as asked by shareholders, unless creditors agree
to debt restructuring), lead us to conclude that the Kazakh government is not
prepared to sacrifice its financial strength to repay bank external debts that
at year-end 2008 amounted to about 30% of GDP (see "Kazakhstan-Based
Kazkommertsbank (JSC) And Halyk Bank Downgraded On Lower
Likelihood Of State
Support; Outlooks Negative," published on May 6, 2009, on RatingsDirect).
Despite the revision of the sovereign outlook, we expect the Kazakh
economy to remain under significant stress in 2009. Banks face substantial
principal repayments of external debt in 2009 and Standard & Poor's expects
most loans that are not rescheduled to be repaid rather than rolled over,
thereby contributing to a forecast economic contraction of 3%, which would in
turn contribute to a further worsening of asset quality. We expect lending
under the government's fiscal stimulus package to drive the general government
into a deficit of 8.1% of GDP in 2009, although a recovery in oil prices
versus the conservative $40 budgeted oil price would narrow the deficit this
year. We believe that Kazakhstan is well placed to provide stimulus support
and, if necessary, further capital to systemically important banks, as it
holds little debt and retains fiscal assets in the National Oil Fund of the
Republic of Kazakhstan amounting to 23% of forecast 2009 GDP.
While we project that the current account will operate a deficit this
year, the forecast is closely linked to what happens to Kazakhstan's terms of
trade. The current account deficit could narrow markedly should banks delay
interest payments or if oil prices continue to recover to higher levels.
Kazakhstan's current account deficit is expected to be covered fully by
committed foreign direct investment (FDI) into the oil sector as well as the
provision, in the near term, of $10 billion in funds from the Chinese
government in return for access to Kazakhstan's energy resources. Kazakhstan's
monetary reserves also remain sizeable.
"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the Kazakh government
will manage the economic challenges that the country faces without severe
impairment to its fiscal or external balance sheets," Mr. Faulks said.
A substantially more expansive fiscal stance--principally via far greater
support to troubled banks--than we currently expect would bring downward
pressure on the ratings. A protracted period of low oil prices would also test
the Kazakh government's fiscal prudence and bring downward pressure on the
currency, further exacerbating banking difficulties. The ratings could be
raised if the current difficulties are overcome in such a way as to allow
economic growth to recover to its long-term potential rate.