Ecco lo studio di Mediobanca sull'uscita dall'euro....

Sinteticamente?
 
Ok allora le abbiamo già confutate.
 
cmq Minenna l'ho sentito dalal Gruber insieme a Ichino e Borghi mi ha fatto una buona impressione.

Leggo....


"Such an asymmetric re-equilibrium shows a dangerous beggar-thy-neighbour zero-sum game in the
Eurozone. This is very much the case for the export-led Italian economy, which historically made
excessive devaluation the oil of its growth engine and the band-aid for implementing structural
reforms. "

Eh. Sempre li si finisce. Possibile che l'Italia non abbia altro mezzo che la svalutazione?

"A voluntary debt re-profiling could be an option if no-growth persists . . .
It therefore looks most likely to us that debt sustainability will remain at the heart of the debate in
Italy and that Brussels will continue to question the soundness of the public accounts of the
country. The right-hand chart above shows the forecast of the debt/GDP ratio according to the
Italian Treasury under the Programmatic Scenario (planned reforms will be successfully
implemented). According to this forecast, the ratio should start to decline this year from 132.8% to
132.5%. But, the European Commission disagrees: in its latest forecast, the Commission expects that
Italy’s public debt vs. GDP will continue to increase, reaching 133.1%.
This situation might sooner or later prompt the country to consider some sort of re-profiling of its
debt, we believe. In the next chapter, we attempt to estimate the room for manoeuvre on the re
denomination front when taking into account public debt issued under domestic vs foreign law, and
when adding CACs to the equation.
A voluntary debt exchange offer could therefore be the most realistic way to return Italy’s debt to a
sustainable path. This could be achieved via maturity extension, via lowered coupons or via a
combination of the two. A recent German proposal (Lars Feld and the German Council) suggests
such a scenario as a pre-condition to accessing ESM support for the banking sector:
 Maturity extension required if debt/GDP ratio exceeds certain levels (60-90%);
 refinancing volumes exceed 15-20% of GDP;
 two to three violations of fiscal rules in the last five years;
 deeper restructuring required if debt/GDP ratio exceeds 90%; and
 new class of bonds to be issued with Creditor Participation Clauses with three key changes
versus CACs bonds: 1) single limb voting for CAC to avoid holdouts (75% majority) and
amendment to pari passu clauses; 2) enforced moratorium anchored in the ESM Treaty;
and 3) phase-out of privileges for sovereign debt in banking regulation"

Wut?!?!
 
...e l'alternativa sarebbe:
"or the ‘Italexit’ and re denomination debate will gather pace
Without these changes, the debate regarding a unilateral exit from the Eurozone and a consequent
return to the lira looks likely to gain momentum based on the political situation in Rome post the
next elections, which we expect to take place in spring 2018, and depending on the electoral
outcomes in France and the Netherlands this spring. The redenomination of (a part of) the public
debt and the psychological depreciation of the lira could support a substantial curtailment of the
debt and, together with the new-found monetary sovereignty, could create the conditions for a
genuine reboot of the Italian economy. However, our conclusions in the next chapter will show that
time has gone to cash in the benefit from re denomination given roughly half of the Italian debt is
already constrained by CACs"
 
...e si finisce:

Redenomination: €232bn cost vs €239bn gain
In quantifying the magnitude of the problem we assume:
 Some 30% devaluation for the new currency;
 All non CACs bonds to benefit from the Lex Monetae, thus resulting in an implicit
redenomination gain for the country;
 All CACs bonds and all bonds under foreign law to be reimbursed in Euros with the
depreciated currency, hence generating a loss from redenomination for the country, i.e.
no intention from the government to fight CACs bondholders;
 The MTM of derivatives to be paid in Euros, thus crystallizing a loss for its entire amount of
€37bn;
 The €210bn QE bonds to be equally split between CACs and non CACs and the Bank of Italy
to redenominated by overtaking the no risk sharing principle behind QE.
Cumulated inflation gap drives currency depreciation
Ideally, our attempt to quantify the cost of redenomination should reflect the potential FX of the
new currency. Although a proper analysis of the many drivers behind such an answer is outside of
the scope of this note, the gap between the cumulated inflation since Eurozone access between
Italy and Germany offers a good proxy as a starting point. As shown below, this currently amounts
to roughly 15%. We think that a new lira would eventually devalue much more, especially in the
short term. As such, for the sake of simplicity we price in some 30% depreciation, or 2x the
cumulated inflation gap.
 
inoltre.... più passa il tempo meno conviene all'Italia uscire, dal momento che tutti i bond saranno sotto le CAC.

Time is money for Italy – disincentive to re-denominate as time passes
Every year it becomes more expensive to leave the euro .
The migration of Italian bonds under CACs is already halfway through. This is why we still manage to
get to a neutral net impact from re denomination, as the gains from the Lex Monetae still available
on nearly half of the public debt under domestic law offset the loss on the other half of the stock
already under CACs. However, our projections suggest that by 2022 such a migration will be fully
completed and all Italian debt will be constrained by CACs. Accordingly, every year the cost of re
denomination increases while the benefit from the lex monetae decreases. In the table below we
estimate €206bn extra re denomination loss by 2022, which essentially reduces in an exponential
way the incentive to re denominate as time goes by.
 
una chiosa importante:

Financially, not economically, exit does not offer any reward, rather the opposite
Investors’ concern for Italexit as time goes by is understandable on an economic basis. The lack of
growth, the lack of competitiveness and the high unemployment rate represent strong incentives to
eventually exploit monetary sovereignty.
However our analysis shows that on a financial basis the opposite is true: the financial benefit of
entering in a re denomination scenario is no longer available and from now on it will actually cost
money to leave. And this is before adding private debt to the equation, which will surely make exit
even less desirable.
 
inoltre.... più passa il tempo meno conviene all'Italia uscire, dal momento che tutti i bond saranno sotto le CAC.

il punto centrale è questo...
si è perso troppo tempo a dire "che non si poteva uscire" invece di fare un serio dibattito sul fatto che ci avessimo realmente guadagnato o perso dalla moneta unica.
Adesso i costi saranno maggiori, abbiamo perso almeno 7anni per l'incompetenza di classe dirigente e miopia di istituzioni come mediobanca e tutta confindustria.

adesso che si sono resi conto che l'euro è servito anche a rendere il capitalismo italiano "sbranabile" da altri stanno cambiando registro.

cmq... che non usciremo mai da soli mi pare sia assodato, la probabilità è meno di zero. Come sappiamo ci penseranno gli americani a togliere il giocattolino alla germania ma questo studio dimostra che ai "piani alti" sanno. Spero perciò che quando sarà il momento si facciano trovare pronti sia l'apparato pubblico e quello privato.
 
che avresti confutato tu?!?!?! :rotfl:

se c'è qualche errore fai un fax a mediobanca e glielo fai presente!:D

di certo tu ne saprai più di loro.:o:clap::fiufiu:

Gli stanno sfilando Generali sotto il naso. Se fossero dei geni non avrebbero da sparare queste *******te per sperare che il governo gli salvi le partecipazioni.

Possiamo chiudere la discussione basata su "tizio dice".
 
Quindi non dicono di quanto si svaluterà la nuova moneta, però ci assicurano che uscire sarà conveniente.

E i boccaloni abboccano.
 
il punto centrale è questo...
si è perso troppo tempo a dire "che non si poteva uscire" invece di fare un serio dibattito sul fatto che ci avessimo realmente guadagnato o perso dalla moneta unica.

Non conveniva, non conviene, non converrà (se non a specifici e minoritari gruppi, di solito equiparabili alle rendite di posizione dell'industria italica).
 
Quindi oltre agli economisti no euro e ai premi nobel,dobbiamo criminalizzare pure mediobanca ora.... :D

E qua siamo al ridicolo...:D
 
inoltre.... più passa il tempo meno conviene all'Italia uscire, dal momento che tutti i bond saranno sotto le CAC.

Time is money for Italy – disincentive to re-denominate as time passes
Every year it becomes more expensive to leave the euro .
The migration of Italian bonds under CACs is already halfway through. This is why we still manage to
get to a neutral net impact from re denomination, as the gains from the Lex Monetae still available
on nearly half of the public debt under domestic law offset the loss on the other half of the stock
already under CACs. However, our projections suggest that by 2022 such a migration will be fully
completed and all Italian debt will be constrained by CACs. Accordingly, every year the cost of re
denomination increases while the benefit from the lex monetae decreases. In the table below we
estimate €206bn extra re denomination loss by 2022, which essentially reduces in an exponential
way the incentive to re denominate as time goes by.

Ma con le cac se lo stato fa default semplicemente ristruttura i bond, perché sarebbero un ostacolo per uscire??
 
Quindi oltre agli economisti no euro e ai premi nobel,dobbiamo criminalizzare pure mediobanca ora.... :D

E qua siamo al ridicolo...:D

Può venire anche il Papa rimane una baggianata.

Distruggere tra 1000 e 2000 MLD di euro di capita lo è
 
Indietro