..e siamo ai titoli con rendimento NEGATIVO

[ramirez]

Oggi la Germania ha emesso PER LA PRIMA VOLTA NELLA SUA
STORIA titoli con rendimento negativo.
Ieri avevo postato un articolo in proposito del FT
sotto il titolo del 3d.....e dicevano che era colpa del Governo (naturalmente
cassato senza neanche capirne il significato).
Il Ft faceva notare che è morta la capacità della moneta
di moltiplicarsi A LIVELLO MONDIALE.
Oggi gli investitori non vogliono un rendimento sui titoli
voglionoche i titoli esistano ancora alla scadenza.
Sono disposti ad accettare rendimenti negativi !!!!!!!!
.

[ramirez]

..ed ecco il 'pezzo' dal FT che aveva mosso le acque
..in anticipo. Scusate ma si parla del FT ..mica del sole 24 ore
.
The Gross paranormal, a.k.a the time depreciation of money
Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Jan 04 14:10.
Bill Gross of Pimco is always worth reading.

On Wednesday the undisputed king of the bond markets followed up on thoughts originally set out in the Financial Times in December. This is good because the original article confused a lot of people. In some cases it even angered them outright.

Of course, we presume Gross would simply have taken this as proof that people (academics, financial experts and all sorts) don’t understand his new financial paradigm. Or rather, what underpins it and how it works.

FT Alphaville has already described the shift as going through ‘the looking glass’ – entering a world where the time value of money turns into the time depreciation of money instead.

Gross, meanwhile, has named it the ‘paranormal’.

At the heart of the misunderstanding is how our credit-based monetary financial universe really works, and why it is that lenders can’t make money in a zero interest rate framework — especially if the yield curve is flat many years forward.

In this world, de-leveraging becomes the name of the game, with monetary flows pushing themselves back into real-world assets.

As Gross explains (our emphasis):

But before ringing in the New Year with a rather grim foreboding, let me at least describe what financial markets came to know as the “old normal.” It actually began with early 20th century fractional reserve banking, but came into its adulthood in 1971 when the U.S. and the world departed from gold to a debt-based credit foundation. Some called it a dollar standard but it was really a credit standard based on dollars and unlike gold with its scarcity and hard money character, the new credit-based standard had no anchor – dollar or otherwise. All developed economies from 1971 and beyond learned to use credit and the expansion of debt to drive growth and prosperity.

Almost all developed and some emerging economies became hooked on credit as a substitution for investment in tangible real things – plant, equipment and an educated labor force. They made paper, not things, so much of it it seems, that they debased it. Interest rates were lowered and assets securitized to the point where they could go no further and in the aftermath of Lehman 2008 markets substituted sovereign for private credit until it appears that that trend can go no further either. Now we are left with zero-bound yields and creditors that trust no one and very few countries. The financial markets are slowly imploding – delevering – because there’s too much paper and too little trust. Goodbye “Old Normal,” standby to redefine “New Normal,” and welcome to 2012’s “paranormal.”
The key point, however, is this:

Conceptually, when the financial system can no longer find outlets for the credit it creates, then it de-levers.
Thus we enter the ‘great deleveraging’ — brought on by preferences focused on real or liquid assets which constrain money supply and eat away at our 40-year global credit expansion like ‘invisible termites’.

At this point capital preservation becomes the investor’s mantra, not the idea of additional return:

Will Rogers once fondly said in the Depression that he was more concerned about the return of his money than the return on his money. But from a system-wide perspective, when the return on money becomes close to zero in nominal terms and substantially negative in real terms, then normal functionality may breakdown. We all start to resemble Will Rogers.
This concept is definitely starting to capture public imagination. A similar point, after all, was raised by Greg Canavan at the Daily Reckoning blog last month. We liked how he explained it:

But easy credit has for many years influenced those decisions. Now, the global economy’s appetite for more debt, which is already well over and above its ability to produce real assets, is sated. That means there is more debt in the world than there are real assets to back that debt. That in itself is a scary thought.

That’s why the old cycle of recession, followed by lower interest rates, an increase in new debt and recovery, is over. Debt indigestion means we can no longer rely on more debt to pull us out of a slump. That hasn’t stopped the politicians and central banks from trying though. On a global basis, the only new debt creation now is government debt. It is entirely unproductive and eats into what’s left of the wealth created by the private sector. That’s hardly conducive to good old ‘wealth creation’.
Whether it’s via deflation or inflation, time depreciation of money (or wealth) is now guaranteed.

As Gross sees it, both eventualities are equally possible:

This new duality – credit and zero-bound interest rate risk – is what characterizes our financial markets of 2012. It offers the fat-left-tailed possibility of unforeseen – delevering – or the fat-right-tailed possibility of central bank inflationary expansion.
Only the actions of governments and central banks can determine which way the wealth destruction will happen. Deflation would reward the holders of ‘non-productive’ government debt, while inflation would reward the holders of tangible real assets. QE (or a lack of QE), meanwhile, could help tip the balance either way.

What’s fair to say is that without government intervention continued capital flows into “safe government securities” would lead to an inevitable giant tidal wave of deflation — just as they did during the original Great Depression.

Of course, unless money can be encouraged to flow into productive assets, it’s hard to say whether wealth creation can really ever be reinvigorated by compensatory government and central bank credit expansion moves. At least for the foreseeable future.

[el_figus]

ma da profano che vantaggio ha qualcuno a mettere dei soldi a rendimento negativo piuttosto che tenerli banalmente sotto al materasso?

[marc_]

Originalmente inviato da el_figus

ma da profano che vantaggio ha qualcuno a mettere dei soldi a rendimento negativo piuttosto che tenerli banalmente sotto al materasso?

più del materasso, è ad oggi il modo più sicuro di parcheggiare la liquidità..

[plak]

Originalmente inviato da marc_

più del materasso, è ad oggi il modo più sicuro di parcheggiare la liquidità..

Piuttosto che investire in perdita, investo su un sistema di sicurezza in casa / telecamere/ mazze da baseball.

[skymap]

Originalmente inviato da el_figus

ma da profano che vantaggio ha qualcuno a mettere dei soldi a rendimento negativo piuttosto che tenerli banalmente sotto al materasso?

Per un piccolo investitore zero vantaggi, per un medio investitore qualcosa ai tassi da fame tedeschi ci può stare nell'ottica di diversificazione del portafoglio, istituzionali e fondi non possono mettere il denaro nel pagliericcio in attesa di tempi migliori.

Considerando però che l'ultima asta dei bund non era stata totalmente coperta, direi che anche gli istituzionali non si azzuffano per comprare e ricevere in cambio l'elemosina.

[bullshare]

Originalmente inviato da skymap

Per un piccolo investitore zero vantaggi, per un medio investitore qualcosa ai tassi da fame tedeschi ci può stare nell'ottica di diversificazione del portafoglio, istituzionali e fondi non possono mettere il denaro nel pagliericcio in attesa di tempi migliori.

Considerando però che l'ultima asta dei bund non era stata totalmente coperta, direi che anche gli istituzionali non si azzuffano per comprare e ricevere in cambio l'elemosina.

No di solito quando ci son tassi negativi è perchè gli investitori istituzionali sono interessati ad asset sicuri da usare come collateral, quindi non li prendono per il rendimento.

Cmq già da qualche mese la Germania ha il bund 1Y con tassi negativi.

[skymap]

Le banche fanno uso di collaterale, i fondi comuni e pensione che investono sul monetario comprano anche tds tedeschi magari in misura minore ma comprano.

[bullshare]

Originalmente inviato da skymap

Le banche fanno uso di collaterale, i fondi comuni e pensione che investono sul monetario comprano anche tds tedeschi magari in misura minore ma comprano.

Si esatto, il rendimento negativo quindi si può spiegare solo con quella parte di domanda che vuole collateral.

[fdg86]

Oltre alla necessità di collateral, è possibile che venga anche scontata la probabile deflazione dei Q1 e Q2 2012.