eh si, vuoi mettere gli esperti..

[ramirez]

Mi è venuto un poco da ridere...
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Tetlock systematically collected a vast number of individual forecasts about political and economic events, made by recognised experts over a period of more than 20 years. He showed that these forecasts were not very much better than making predictions by chance, and also that experts performed only slightly better than the average person who was casually informed about the subject in hand. Depressingly, he found that there were remarkably small gains to greater expertise when it came to forecasting accuracy.

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un bell'articolo sul perchè gli economisti sono incapaci di prevedere
disruptive events..
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Why can’t economists predict disruptive events? | gavyn davies | Insight into macroeconomics and the financial markets from the Financial Times

[ramirez]

sempre sul tema..
e fatevi 4 risate..che fa bene..
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LIKE most other government and multilateral agencies, not to mention economists in academia and elsewhere, the IMF entirely failed to see the global crisis coming. This is hardly news, so you might think that yesterday’s internal report into the fund’s performance in the period leading up to the global crisis might have little to offer (unless it tried to whitewash the fund’s failure, which it doesn’t).

Indeed, the report doesn’t offer any particularly startling revelations or novel reasons for why the fund so completely failed to spot any warning signs in its regular surveillance of major economies during 2004-07. But its willingness to provide a list of the (often pretty embarrassing) things the IMF’s reports said in that period still make for pretty interesting—and occasionally, cringe-inducing—reading. Here are some of my favourite bits.

On the American housing market:

In the United States, for example, it did not discuss, until the crisis had already erupted, the deteriorating lending standards for mortgage financing, or adequately assess the risks and impact of a major housing price correction on financial institutions…As late as April 2006, shortly before U.S. housing prices peaked, the WEO and the GFSR explained away the rising share of non-traditional mortgages in the United States thus: “Default rates on residential mortgage loans have been low historically. Together with securitization of the mortgage market, this suggests that the impact of a slowing housing market on the financial sector is likely to be limited.
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On the overall message of the fund’s flagship World Economic Outlook:

According to the WEO, the world economic outlook was “among the rosiest” in a decade (April 2004); expected to be “one of its strongest years of growth” unless events take “an awful turn” (September 2004); in the “midst of an extraordinary purple patch” (April 2006); and “strong” (September 2006); all the way up to April 2007 when the report forecast that “world growth will continue to be strong” and opined that global economic risks had declined since September 2006.
Public pronouncements by officials were equally behind the curve:

(A)late as August 2007, Management considered the global economic outlook to be “very favorable.”...Meanwhile,...(in) July 2008...the message was that “risks of a financial tail event have eased.
Even when some of its officials had different ideas, the fund’s management seemed not to be listening. Its then chief economist, Raghuram Rajan, concluded a presentation at the annual Jackson Hole conference of central bankers in 2005 by arguing that “we should be prepared for the low probability but highly costly downturn”. But the IMF now admits that:

Despite the importance of the Economic Counsellor’s position, there was no follow up on Rajan’s analysis and concerns— his views did not influence the IMF’s work program or even the flagship documents issued after the Jackson Hole speech.
In 2006, the fund formed a task force to examine how it could strengthen its financial sector analysis and better integrate this into its annual economic surveillance of individual economies. The report of the task force provided some examples of best practices. Of these, the new report says that “in retrospect, (they) appear completely off the mark”.

[B]Exhibit A: Iceland. The 2006 task force report said that Iceland’s developments from 2003–06 “provide a useful illustration of the importance of a proper analysis of the relationships between financial markets, the financial sector, and the broad economy”. It concluded its discussion of the country by saying, “(I)n Iceland’s case … hedging behavior and generally sound balance sheets and asset-liability management made the financial system relatively robust to the recent shocks[/B]

[San Siro]

Originalmente inviato da ramirez

sempre sul tema..
e fatevi 4 risate..che fa bene..
.
LIKE most other government and multilateral agencies, not to mention economists in academia and elsewhere, the IMF entirely failed to see the global crisis coming. This is hardly news, so you might think that yesterday’s internal report into the fund’s performance in the period leading up to the global crisis might have little to offer (unless it tried to whitewash the fund’s failure, which it doesn’t).

Indeed, the report doesn’t offer any particularly startling revelations or novel reasons for why the fund so completely failed to spot any warning signs in its regular surveillance of major economies during 2004-07. But its willingness to provide a list of the (often pretty embarrassing) things the IMF’s reports said in that period still make for pretty interesting—and occasionally, cringe-inducing—reading. Here are some of my favourite bits.

On the American housing market:

In the United States, for example, it did not discuss, until the crisis had already erupted, the deteriorating lending standards for mortgage financing, or adequately assess the risks and impact of a major housing price correction on financial institutions…As late as April 2006, shortly before U.S. housing prices peaked, the WEO and the GFSR explained away the rising share of non-traditional mortgages in the United States thus: “Default rates on residential mortgage loans have been low historically. Together with securitization of the mortgage market, this suggests that the impact of a slowing housing market on the financial sector is likely to be limited.
.

On the overall message of the fund’s flagship World Economic Outlook:

According to the WEO, the world economic outlook was “among the rosiest” in a decade (April 2004); expected to be “one of its strongest years of growth” unless events take “an awful turn” (September 2004); in the “midst of an extraordinary purple patch” (April 2006); and “strong” (September 2006); all the way up to April 2007 when the report forecast that “world growth will continue to be strong” and opined that global economic risks had declined since September 2006.
Public pronouncements by officials were equally behind the curve:

(A)late as August 2007, Management considered the global economic outlook to be “very favorable.”...Meanwhile,...(in) July 2008...the message was that “risks of a financial tail event have eased.
Even when some of its officials had different ideas, the fund’s management seemed not to be listening. Its then chief economist, Raghuram Rajan, concluded a presentation at the annual Jackson Hole conference of central bankers in 2005 by arguing that “we should be prepared for the low probability but highly costly downturn”. But the IMF now admits that:

Despite the importance of the Economic Counsellor’s position, there was no follow up on Rajan’s analysis and concerns— his views did not influence the IMF’s work program or even the flagship documents issued after the Jackson Hole speech.
In 2006, the fund formed a task force to examine how it could strengthen its financial sector analysis and better integrate this into its annual economic surveillance of individual economies. The report of the task force provided some examples of best practices. Of these, the new report says that “in retrospect, (they) appear completely off the mark”.

[B]Exhibit A: Iceland. The 2006 task force report said that Iceland’s developments from 2003–06 “provide a useful illustration of the importance of a proper analysis of the relationships between financial markets, the financial sector, and the broad economy”. It concluded its discussion of the country by saying, “(I)n Iceland’s case … hedging behavior and generally sound balance sheets and asset-liability management made the financial system relatively robust to the recent shocks[/B]

L'errore del tuo ragionamento è considerare gli economisti degli esperti.

Lo sarebbero, se facessero il loro mestiere.

In realtà fanno i percettori di tangenti erogate dal Fondo Monetario, dalla Banca Mondiale, dall'Ocse, che sono in realtà organi politici.

Se vogliono continuare a beccarsi le prebende, devono dire quello che ci si aspetta da loro.

Che la bolla immobiliare avrebbe generato una crisi erano anni che lo si diceva. Poi, le forme e l'estensione che l'hanno contraddistinta non erano state immaginate in tutta la loro ampiezza, ma sicuramente se questi economisti avessero avuto un certo potere di interdizione e di indirizzo, la crisi non ci sarebbe stata.

[ramirez]

lo scopo del 3d è di dimostrare che IN OGNUNO DI NOI
C'E' UN ESPERTO. Sbagliamo esattamente come quelli veri.
Quindi? Quindi tutti dovrebbero volare bassi...